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Abstract
Australian immigration policy, in common with the US and Canada,
has increased the emphasis on skill based selection criteria. We examine
immigrant overeducation in the early phases of settlement in Australia. In
particular, we assess the role of visa category of entry and region of origin.
In contrast to expectations, skill based visa immigrants did not experi-
ence markedly lower overeducation rates than those on family based visas.
Whereas immigrants from Non-English Speaking Backgrounds, especially
Asian, faced higher rates of overeducation. Overeducation translates into
a earnings penalties. Based on the results in this study, the aggressive pur-
suit of skill based immigration policies may not lead to any substantial
reduction in immigrant overeducation.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Recently in Australia, Canada and the US, immigration policy has decidedly
shifted towards skill based immigration (Cobb-Clark 2000). This has been con-
sidered as a means to reducing assimilation problems. Immigrants with appro-
priate education and skills should achieve better labour market outcomes in the
recipient country. For Australia, skilled immigration increased in the 1990s,
whereas family based immigration declined (DIMIA 1999). A major element
of skill-based assessment is related to educational qualications. Therefore a
natural policy question to ask is how e¤ectively the qualications of immigrant
groups are utilised in the recipient country.
We examine the extent to which the immigrantseducational qualications
are utilised in their jobs within Australia. In particular, we analyse the inci-
dence and impact of overeducation for recent immigrant arrivals to Australia.
Overeducation appears to be a pervasive feature of labour markets 1 , and is
generally associated with reduced remuneration (Battu et al. 1999, Battu et
al. 2000, Dolton and Vignoles 2000, Chevalier 2003, Rubb 2003, Frenette 2004).
Overeducation is an important dimension of assimilation for immigrants, as it
signals possible impediments to the transferability of human capital between
countries (Friedberg 2000). This study provides the rst analysis of overed-
ucation for immigrants, where we are able to distinguish visa-based categories
with the presumption that skilled based immigrants will have lower incidences
1For example, Green et al. (2002) nd overeducation in the British labour market to
be around 30 - 32.9%. Sicherman (1991) nd almost 40% of workers in the USA to be
overeducated.
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of overeducation.
The data set used in this survey, the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrant
Australians (LSIA), covers the immediate (3 to 4 year) period following arrival
in Australia. It was designed specically to examine the experiences of immi-
grants. As a result it contains information not generally available in labour force
or census data sources. Of particular interest for our purposes, it provides infor-
mation such as entry visa category, education qualications, nancial situation
on arrival, access to a private motor vehicle and previous visits to Australia.
Immigrants can face labour market conditions that vary markedly from those
of their country of origin. This study is also novel insofar as we consider the
performance of immigrant groups with varying degrees of assimilation poten-
tial. Specically we compare the relative labour market performance of recently
arrived male immigrants in full-time employment from non-English speaking
backgrounds (NESB) and those from English speaking backgrounds (ESB)2 .
Due to the close ties to the United Kingdom, English remains the predomi-
nate rst language in Australia, and is the primary language used within the
Australian education and training system.
Thus, ESB immigrants would be expected to face fewer impediments to
assimilation when compared to NESB immigrants. The latter group may face
di¢ culty in getting their educational qualications recognised by employers,
su¤er from language di¢ culties and face racial discrimination. Flatau et al
(1995) demonstrated that ESB immigrants to Australia have similar labour
2Namely the United Kingdom, Ireland, USA ,Canada, South Africa and Zimbabwe.
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market outcomes to that of Australian born residents (ABRs) 3 . The same
is not true for NESB immigrants who face a large earnings gap (relative to
the native population) which does not appear to signicantly narrow over time
(McDonald and Worswick 1999). The degree of assimilation di¢ culty faced by
NESB immigrants in Australia will vary according to their country of origin.
Broadly, they can be split into two groups, those from Asia and those from other
countries (predominantly continental Europe or from Middle Eastern/North
African countries)4 . Of these two groups, Asian NESB immigrants are likely
to face particular transition problems due to the greater potential for racial
discrimination and greater dissimilarity in institutional framework (Borooah
and Mangan 2002). There is some evidence that minority groups su¤er higher
incidences of educational mismatch and this translates to reduced returns to
education (Battu and Sloane 2004). The data used in this study allows us
to examine the incidence and determinants of educational mismatch and the
relative wage performance of these three distinct immigrant groups.
To summarise our results; Visa category of entry is an important determinant
of overeducation for all immigrants. In general, those immigrants who have
to fulll higher skill requirements for visa eligibility experience lower rates of
overeducation. Additionally, we nd that Asian NESB immigrants have by far
the highest incidence of overeducation, 36 per cent compared to 31 percent for
Other NESB and 22 percent for ESB immigrants. For the two NESB immigrant
3See also Miller and Neo (1997) and Mcdonald and Worswick (1999).
4 In the LSIA sample 51% were from continential Europe, 22% were from Middle East-
ern/North African countries.
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groups this incidence rate does not appear to diminish over our 3 year sample
period. Furthermore, this rate is higher than the Australian national average
overeducation rate for full-time male employees Interestingly, Asian immigrants
higher incidence of overeducation appears to be related, in part, to a lack of
English language skills and nancial constraints.
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. Section 2 provides back-
ground information on immigrants to Australia and outlines the data source.
Section 3 outlines the econometric methodology. Section 4 discusses the results,
whilst section 5 concludes.
2 BACKGROUND AND DATA
The scale of post-war migration has been large, with nearly 6 million individuals
migrating to Australia in the post-war period (Cobb-Clark 2003: 656). Aus-
tralian migration policy has changed markedly in the post war period, evolving
from the White Australia Policy to one based on the separation of migrants into
family, skilled and humanitarian groups. The e¤ect this has had on immigrant
composition is reected in the declining proportion of ESB immigrants For
instance in the period 1959 to 1965, 76 per cent of permanent settler arrivals
were ESB immigrants; this had declined to 46 per cent in the period covering
1975 to 1980, and decreased further to 28 per cent for the 1990 to 1995 period.
(Teicher et al. 2002)
Under the immigration system at the time of the LSIA, immigrants entered
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Australia on one of ve visa categories; these are Independent Skilled, Busi-
ness/Employment Nominated Scheme(ENS), Concessional Family, Preferential
Family and Humanitarian visas. Those who arrive on the Independent Skilled
or Business/ENS visas are fully assessed based on their skill level5 . Immigrants
with Business visas full the requirements that they can be expected to go into
business shortly after arrival while those on ENS visas are nominated by Aus-
tralian employers to ll skilled positions vacant in the domestic labour market.
Concessional Family visa holders are skilled assessed but obtain points for hav-
ing close relatives that are willing to sponsor and provide support during their
rst two years in Australia. Thus, their skill level need not be on par with
those in the Independent Skilled visa category. Those on Humanitarian and
Preferential Family visas are not skilled assessed and obtain their visas based
on humanitarian reasons and family links, respectively.
The data source used in this paper is drawn from the Longitudinal Survey of
Immigrants to Australia (LSIA6). The LSIA attempts to "document the settle-
ment, including the labour market experiences, of a cohort of recently arrived,
o¤shore-visaed immigrants to Australia" (Cobb-Clark, 2001: 467). As a result
it contains information not generally available in labour force or census data
sources. The LSIA looks at a cohort of immigrants to Australia that arrived
between September 1993 and August 1995. This group was interviewed approx-
imately ve months (wave 1), 17 months (wave 2) and 41 months (wave 3) after
5For more details see Miller (1999) and Teicher et al.( 2002).
6For an encompassing review of the dataset, see Cobb-Clark (2001). For a detailed look
at the technical aspects of the LSIA see the user documentation by the Department of Immi-
gration and Multicultural and Indegenous A¤airs (DIMIA 2002).
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arrival (Cobb-Clark 2001). However, some variation in the timing of interviews
occurred, and as a result each individualsperiod of residence at time of inter-
view di¤ers. Participants are questioned on a wide range of issues including
visa type, English language ability and country of origin, nancial situation on
arrival, access to a car and prior visits to Australia.
This paper investigates primary applicants from the rst cohort group num-
bering 5192 persons aged 15 years and over7 . Attrition rates decreased the
sample to 4469 primary applicants in the second wave and 3752 in the third
wave, a rate of 28% (Cobb-Clark 2001, DIMIA 2002). DIMIA (2002) could nd
no evidence of signicant bias in relation to economic activity classication as
a result of attrition from the sample. Furthermore, between waves 1 and 3 the
average age of ESB and Asian NESB immigrants increased by approximately
3.2 years, and 2.8 years for Other NESB immigrants. Hence, there appears to
be little evidence of attrition of specic age groups of immigrants across the
three categories. The analysis is restricted to male primary applicants aged 15
to 64 at the time of rst interview8 . We also exclude individuals with multiple
jobs, and focus on individuals in full-time employment9 . This provides an un-
balanced panel of 1,604 individuals; of these, 376 are ESB immigrants, 582 are
7New Zealand citizens, who do not have to apply to migrate to Australia unlike other
nationalities, are excluded from this sample.
8Most studies of labour market performance exclude females on the grounds of sample
selection bias (see Dolton and Makepeace, 1993). Migrant women might also be tied-movers
who enter into occupations merely to supplement family income (Frank, 1978; Worswick,
1996).
9Male part-time workers constitute approximately 4% (ESB), 9% (Asian NESB) and 10%
(Other NESB) of total employment. This compares to an Australian working age population
gure for males of 13% in 1996. In all econometric analysis we examine the e¤ects of including
part-time workers on our estimates.
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NESB Asians, and 666 are Other NESB immigrants.
INSERT TABLE 1
Table 1 presents sample averages for our three immigrant groups for males
who held a full-time job at some point during our sample period10 . Briey,
a greater proportion of ESB immigrants enter as Business/ENS visa holders
compared to NESB immigrants, and they have higher average years of education
and are on average older. Other NESB immigrants were most likely to enter
under non-assessed visas, while Asian NESB immigrants are most likely to enter
under either Concessional Family or Independent Skilled visas. ESB immigrants
were substantially more likely to have visited Australia before settlement, to
have a car and to have funds on arrival. Only a small proportion of NESB
immigrants reported speaking English uently upon arrival.
3 METHODOLOGY
3.1 Incidence of Overeducation
This paper examines mismatch between educational qualications and occupa-
tional requirements using a measure of overeducation. Immigrants enter with
qualications from a large variety of educational systems. Some of these will
be of the same standard to the equivalent qualication in Australia. Others
may nominally be of the same standard but be of a lower content and/or qual-
ity (Friedberg 2000). It is possible for immigrants to Australia to submit their
10For comparison sample averages for the all males aged 15-64 are included as appendix
Table A1.
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qualications for assessment so as to determine comparability. This assessment
is conducted by independent professional bodies appointed by the Federal gov-
ernment, and for our sample, it takes nearly 3 months on average to complete
the process. In some cases this forms part of the process of substantiating visa
eligibility, specically for skill assessed visas. At the time of our sample, how-
ever, not all immigrants who entered under skill assessed visas were required
to submit their qualications for assessment. In other cases, immigrants may
choose to have their qualications assessed at a later stage. As a result, we have
individuals with assessed and non-assessed qualications across all visa cate-
gories. In our sample, Asian immigrants (48%) were slightly more likely to have
had their qualications assessed than ESB immigrants (40%) or Other NESB
immigrants (37%).The proportions by visa category who have their qualica-
tions assessed are similar across immigrant groups, with those on Independent
Skilled visas having the highest proportions (approximately 65%) and those on
Preferential Family visas (approximately 7%) and Humanitarian visas (6%) the
lowest. In the subsequent empirical work we examine how overeducation is
related to the assessment of qualications.
We use job analysis data to determine the occupational requirements of
jobs11 . For each immigrant the occupation code of their jobs was recorded using
the 1996 Australian Standard Classication of Occupation (ASCO) codes (ABS
1997), which is similar to the Directory of Training (DOT) in the United States.
ASCO provides a detailed list of minimum required qualications to undertake a
11Also known as the objective measure of overeducation. See Hartog (2000) for more details.
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particular job. This information can be compared to the education qualications
of the immigrant, and if these qualications exceed the job requirements as
stated this individual is dened as being overeducated (Oi = 1), otherwise they
are not overeducated (Oi = 0).
For any period t the underlying probability of being overeducated.(Oit) is
unobservable, instead we observe a dummy variable (Oit) dened as:
Oit = 1 if Oit > 0
Oit = 0 otherwise
The probability of an immigrant being overeducated can be viewed as a
function of personal characteristics (Xi), visa category (Vi) and time since arrival
(Tit).
Pr(Oit) = 0 + 1Xi + 2Vi + Tit + it; t = 1; 2; 3 (1)
Where the error term consists of two components such that:
it = "it + i
"it is a standard stochastic error term and i is a random e¤ects variable.
Equation (1) is estimated using a random e¤ects probit. An assumption under-
lying the random e¤ects model is that the individual specic component of the
error term is uncorrelated with the independent variables. An alternative which
overcomes this assumption is xed e¤ects estimation whereby a time-invariant
control is included for each individual. However, in the case where the num-
ber of cross-sectional units is large but there are few time periods this leads
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to problems with degrees of freedom and may lead to inconsistent estimates of
parameters(Maddala 1987). Additionally, in a xed e¤ects approach, estimates
of all time invariant covariates are subsumed in the individual specic e¤ect.
As a result the impact of visa-category on overeducation, our principal inter-
est, would be indeterminate. To examine the sensitivity of our random e¤ects
estimates we compare these to those from pooled OLS regression in the results
section.
Whilst some of the covariates used are standard (for instance English lan-
guage skills and marital status), the novel nature of the LSIA allows us to
include a number of less typical covariates. These are briey discussed below, a
full list and description of covariates is included as appendix Table A2.
Overeducation may be explicitly linked to visa category under which immi-
grants enter the country. For instance, immigrants who enter under ENS visas
have generated a job match prior to entry into Australia. This should signify
that the immigrants educational qualication and human capital in general is
recognised or needed by Australian employers. As a result we would expect
these individuals to have lower incidences of overeducation. Likewise, those on
other skilled assessed visas are entering based on their skills being valued in
Australia; hence they should be less susceptible to overeducation. Conversely,
those entering on non-assessed visas are presumably making migration decisions
and being selected for entry based largely on non-economic factors. As a result,
their qualications may be viewed less favourably by Australian employers. We
include controls for whether an immigrant entered under a Humanitarian visa,
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Preferential Family visa, Concessional Family visa, Independent Skilled visa, or
a Business/ENS visa.
We observe the age of our immigrants, but only observe labour market ex-
perience imperfectly For example, the only information on labour market ex-
perience provided is tenure in last job in previous country, if they had a job in
the 12 months prior to immigration. We could use a standard potential labour
market experience term (i.e. age minus years in schooling). However, given
the diversity of schooling/education arrangements across countries this could
introduce unknown bias into the estimates of experience e¤ects. Hence, we use
age (and age squared) in our empirical specications.
Immigration is a costly process. As a result of this immigrants may enter the
country with limited remaining nancial resources. To capture this, we include
a variable No Funds on Arrival. The majority of immigrants to Australia
(at the time of our sample) were unable to access social security benets until 6
months after arrival. Hence, liquidity constraints may force immigrants to lower
their reservation wage so as to shorten their job search period. Those that can
nd jobs may be forced to accept job matches that do not fully utilise their
education and skills. Likewise, immigrants without access to a privately owned
motor vehicle may be forced to accept employment on the basis of geographic
proximity Employment prospects for ethnic minorities in the UK appear to be
closely related to access to transport (Battu and Sloane, 2002, 2004). Hence, we
include a variable to control for immigrants without access to a privately owned
motor vehicle (No Car). A control is also included for whether the individual
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had visited Australia prior to immigration (Never Visited Australia), which may
provide an indication of knowledge of the Australian labour market or previous
contact with Australian employers.
3.2 Earnings
Immigrant earnings are estimated using an augmented human capital model, of
the following form:
lnYit = 0 + 1Srit + 2Ssit + 3Xi + 4Tit + it; t = 1; 2; 3 (2)
Where again the error term consists of two components such that:
it = "it + i
ln Y it is the natural log of weekly wages from employment for the ith indi-
vidual at period t. In the LSIA wages are reported as a categorical variable12 .
From this data we computed midpoint estimates of weekly wages. In unreported
estimations, no signicant di¤erence was found between covariate estimates gen-
erated by pooled OLS and those generated by grouped data maximum likelihood
estimation (Stewart 1983).
Sr measures the return to required education whilst Ss measures the returns
to surplus education. Required education is the level of education of the immi-
grant that equates to job requirements as indicated by ASCO. Surplus education
12These wage categories are 1-57, 58-96, 97-154, 155-230, 231-308, 309-385, 386-481, 482-
577, 578-673, 674-769, 770-961, 962 and more.Hours worked are only available as a categorical
variable. As a result, we cannot accurately compute hourly wages.
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is given by the educational qualications of the immigrant minus the required
level of education for the job as dened by ASCO. On the basis of existing re-
search we expect positive returns to both required and surplus schooling, but
that 2 <1(Hartog 2000):We estimate equation (2) by random e¤ects OLS.
Covariate vectors Xi and Tit are the same as in equation (1).
4 Results
4.1 Incidence of Overeducation
INSERT TABLE 2
Table 2 shows the incidence of overeducation and average weekly wages
across each LSIA wave. ESB immigrants are the best matched, whilst Asian
NESB immigrants have the highest rate of overeducation. Some variation in
the incidence of overeducation is apparent across the waves. ESB immigrants
initially experience a rise in the rate of overeducation, but this rise is more than
reversed by wave 3. For both NESB groups, the rate of overeducation appears
to rise over the sample period.
These overeducation rates appear very high when compared to the evidence
for all male full-time workers in Australia using 1996 census data, where the
rate was 7.5%. Thus recent immigrants appear to have overeducation rates of
between 13% and 25% higher than the national average. However, our immi-
grants on average have 1.5 to 2.5 years of education more than the Australian
average (12 years). If instead, we compare immigrants with graduate quali-
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cations (degree and higher) with the similar group from the overall Australian
population more comparable results are evident. The census gure for male
full-time employees with graduate qualications was 22%, whilst the gures for
graduate immigrants ranged from 13% for ESB, to 25% for Other NESB and
28% for Asian NESB immigrants.
Looking at the average weekly wages in Table 2, it is clear that male ESB
immigrants in full-time employment earn markedly more than their NESB coun-
terparts. For all immigrants, average weekly wages increase over the sample pe-
riod, however the increase is greater for ESB immigrants ($108) than for NESB
immigrants ($83 - $86). Hence, there is no evidence that NESB immigrants
weekly wages catch up to those of ESB immigrants in the early period following
immigration. When compared to 1996 male full-time ordinary earnings for the
Australian population ($720), ESB immigrants in full-time employment appear
to earn slightly more than the average, whilst NESB immigrants in full-time
employment earn substantially less.
INSERT TABLE 3
Table 3 suggests an important role for visa categories in explaining the inci-
dence of overeducation. For all immigrants, those on Business/ENS visas have
the lowest incidence of overeducation. Concessional Family visas are associ-
ated with the highest rates of overeducation for all immigrants. The incidence
of overeducation for Asian NESB immigrants on Concessional Family visas is
particularly large (54%).
A priori expectations are that those on visas not assessed for skills would
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have higher rates of mismatch than those who had their skills assessed. Given
that ENS visa holders are employer nominated and must pass a rigorous screen-
ing process, the nding that Business/ENS visa holders attract low rates of
overeducation is not surprising. The data does not allow for a separation be-
tween Business and ENS categories but it might seem reasonable to suggest,
that at least in the early phase of the settlement process, some of the overed-
ucation in this category arises out of Business visa holders opting to take paid
employment. Interestingly, Independent Skilled visa holders who have to pass
skill requirement standards have substantial rates of overeducation..
4.2 Determinants of Overeducation
INSERT TABLE 4
Table 4 presents the probit estimates of equation (1) for the three immi-
grant groups respectively. To aid interpretation the covariate estimates are
reported as marginal e¤ects. As suggested in Table 3, all of the visa categories
(excepting Asians on Humanitarian visas) are associated with a signicantly
greater incidence of overeducation when compared to the omitted category of
Business/ENS visa. However, after introducing controls for immigrant charac-
teristics the relative di¤erences between visa categories change. For instance,
the impact on overeducation of being an Asian immigrant on an independent
skill visas appears to be far lower than that suggested by the unconditional
means This group may be under-represented with respect to the characteristics
that increase the risk of overeducation. Conversely, Other NESB immigrants on
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Humanitarian visas are at greater risk of overeducation once characteristics are
controlled for.
Looking at the other covariates, although a similar proportion of NESB im-
migrants lack funds on arrival and access to a private car (Table 1), this appears
to be a greater source of overeducation for Asian immigrants. The former may
reect the need to obtain employment faster rather than wait for employment
that best matches their educational qualications. For the latter, those without
access to a private vehicle have a smaller radius in which to nd employment
and hence these individualsemployment market may be substantially geograph-
ically constrained (Battu and Sloane 2002, 2004).
For Asian immigrants, not being uent in English substantially increases the
likelihood of being overeducated. However, this does appear to inuence overe-
ducation for Other NESB immigrants. This language variable is self-reported,
as a result relative estimates of language prociency may vary across immigrant
groups. Age e¤ects are weakly signicant, older Asian immigrants appear more
prone to overeducation, whereas the reverse applies to ESB. Length of time
in Australia is inversely related to overeducation for Other NESB immigrants,
although this e¤ect is quite small in magnitude (roughly a 1% decrease in overe-
ducation incidence for every 200 days). This is in contrast to the relationship
between time in Australia and overeducation suggested by Table 2.
The impact of qualication assessment on overeducation appears perverse.
Specically, NESB immigrants who have had their qualication assessed are
substantially more likely to be overeducated; no such e¤ect is observed for ESB
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immigrants. To investigate this further we distinguish between those who had
their qualication assessment completed before the initial interview and those
who completed the their assessment at a later stage. The rationale for this dis-
tinction is that immigrants who are experiencing labour market di¢ culties are
more likely to pursue later assessment. For example, two-thirds of NESB immi-
grants in our sample who did not pursue assessment stated that this was because
they did not require assessment for the purposes of employment13 . Equation
(1) was re-estimated with separate covariates for qualication assessment prior
to rst interview and assessment after rst interview. For Other NESB immi-
grants, there is no statistically signicant relationship between assessment prior
to the rst interview and overeducation, whilst a signicant relationship be-
tween post immigration assessment and overeducation is indicated. For Asians
both forms of assessment have a signicant positive e¤ect on overeducation, but
the estimated impact of prior qualication assessment (7%) is substantially less
than that for subsequent assessment (13%).
Of course, this result may merely reect endogeneity between overeducation
and qualication assessment. In this case, individuals who have a greater inci-
dence of overeducation are more likely to subsequently seek assessment. How-
ever, the incidence of qualication assessment does not appear to be particularly
correlated with being overeducated in the previous period (correlation coe¢ cient
0.021).
Our grouping of immigrants could be considered somewhat arbitrary. In
13Specically, they answered that qualication assessment was not required due "qualica-
tion readily accepted by employer" or it was "not necessary to get the job" (DIMIA 2002).
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particular, the ESB categories contains immigrants from South Africa and Zim-
babwe. We re-estimated our models with South Africans and Zimbabweans
omitted from the ESB category and found no material di¤erence in the results.
Focusing solely on full-time employees may introduce bias into our estimates.
To investigate this we re-estimated the models with part-time employees in-
cluded. Covariate estimates were not altered, with the exception of age e¤ects,
which in some cases changed signicance but not sign. In addition, the covari-
ate No Car became signicant for Other NESB immigrants and marginally
insignicant for Asian immigrants. Hence, this indicates that access to trans-
port impacts on overeducation for NESB immigrants, but this e¤ect is not highly
robust in our sample.
Finally, estimation through pooled OLS produced e¤ectively the same results
for visa category e¤ects on overeducation. There was change in signicance
for some of the other covariates. For instance, Speak English Poorfor Asian
immigrants became signicant at the 10 per cent level, whereas days since arrival
for other NESB immigrants was not signicant under pooled OLS regression.
4.3 Earnings
INSERT TABLE 5
Table 5 presents the estimates of the log weekly wage equations. For all
immigrants the return to required education is positive. Surplus education earns
a premium above the required level but the rate of return is less than that for
required education. This is consistent with the stylised facts of overeducation
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(Hartog 2000, Rubb 2003, Kler 2005). Thus, an overeducated worker earns less
for a given set of qualications than someone who is appropriately qualied for
their position. Returns to both required and surplus education are lower for
NESB immigrants compared to ESB immigrants.
Days since arrival in Australia is positively associated with weekly wages
for all immigrant groups. Interestingly, this Australian experience e¤ectap-
pears to be larger in magnitude for NESB immigrants than ESB immigrants.
Remembering that wage data in Table 3 indicated that ESB wages were grow-
ing slightly faster than NESB wages, the e¤ects of other inuences more than
counter this experience e¤ect.
NESB immigrants su¤er a wage penalty for not being uent in English. This
is particularly large for Asian immigrants. Having never visited Australia prior
to immigration results in an earnings penalty for all immigrants, but is much
stronger for NESB immigrants. Thus, some prior familiarisation with Australia
may lead to better employment contacts for immigrants or superior knowledge
of the local labour market. Having no funds on arrival appears to lead to lower
earnings for ESB and Other NESB immigrants.
Interestingly, the standard age e¤ects on wages are observed for ESB and
Other NESB immigrants, but there is no signicant relationship for Asian Im-
migrants. This may be indicative of a lack of recognition for prior labour market
experience for this latter group.
As for overeducation results, we examine whether the exclusion of part-time
workers has introduced signicant bias into our estimates. We re-estimate the
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wage equations with part-time workers included. The key features of overedu-
cation e¤ects on wages remain. The penalty for overeducation for other NESB
immigrants increased slightly. In addition the level of signicance of some of the
other covariates changed slightly, but no variable estimate changed between sig-
nicance and insignicance. Pooled OLS regression estimates for weekly wages
produced materially the same results as those presented in Table 5.
5 Conclusion
This paper examined overeducation for groups of immigrants entering Australia
in relation to the emphasis on skill-based immigration policy. The di¤erence
in overeducation rates experienced by immigrants who enter under skill based
and those who enter under family based visas was not as marked as might be
expected. For instance, roughly 30% of males in full-time employment who
entered under Independent Skilled visas were overeducated. In comparison,
male Preferential Family visa holders in full-time employment had overeducation
rates of approximately 35%. Those who entered under Business/ENS visas, the
latter of which are matched to a job prior to arrival had by far the lowest rates
of overeducation:
Additionally, the paper examined overeducation by immigrant region of ori-
gin. The incidence of overeducation for immigrants from English Speaking Back-
grounds is similar to that found in other studies for Australian Born Residents
(Flatau et al, 1995). For immigrants from Non-English Speaking Backgrounds
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(NESB) the incidence of overeducation is higher, especially for those from Asian
countries. NESB immigrants are over represented in the visas categories that
associated with higher rates of overeducation.
A stylised fact of the impact of overeducation is a reduction in the returns
to education (Groot and Maassen van den Brink 2000, Rubb 2003). For all
groups, we nd that immigrants who are overeducated receive lower earnings
than matched immigrants with the same level of education. The magnitude
of the earnings penalty appears to be similar to that found in studies of non-
immigrant groups (Rubb 2003). NESB immigrants su¤er lower rates of return
to the education level required by the job and a similar penalty to education that
is surplus to the job requirement. As NESB immigrants su¤er overeducation
rates that are approximately 50% greater than ESB immigrants they are more
likely to incur lower returns to education, this in turn contributes to their lower
observed earnings.
Recent changes in immigration policy appears to have been sucessful in im-
proving employment outcomes (Cobb-Clark 2003). In addition, during the pe-
riod of these changes the education level of immigrants has increased. However,
the relative rates of overeducation identied in this study, and the particular
problems of NESB immigrants, suggest that the pursuit of skill based immigra-
tion policies may not lead to signicant reductions in the incidence of immigrant
overeducation.
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Table 1: Sample Statistics, Male Full Time Employees Aged 15-64
Variables ESB ASIAN OTHER
Years of Schooling 14.64 13.79 13.48
Age 34.73 32.25 31.28
Not Married 0.28 0.30 0.29
Visa -Humanitarian . 0.09 0.16
Visa - preferential family 0.15 0.19 0.38
Visa - concessional family 0.22 0.29 0.07
Visa - Independent 0.27 0.32 0.21
Visa - Business/ENS 0.36 0.12 0.08
Never Visited Australia 0.25 0.63 0.64
No Funds on Arrival 0.06 0.29 0.33
No Car 0.09 0.32 0.32
Employed in Former Country 0.81 0.75 0.69
Speak English Fluently 0.20 0.13
Speak English Well 0.52 0.50
Speak English Poorly 0.28 0.37
Individuals 376 582 666
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Table 2: Incidence of Overeducation and Weekly Wages, Male Full-Time Em-
ployees Aged 15-64
Overeducation Weekly Wages ($AUD)
ESB Asian Other ESB Asian Other
Wave 1 0.21 0.31 0.28 748.69 550.64 517.00
Wave 2 0.27 0.38 0.31 789.61 543.16 545.65
Wave 3 0.19 0.39 0.34 856.50 633.67 609.25
Average 0.22 0.36 0.31
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Table 3: Incidence of Overeducation by Visa Category and Qualicaton Assess-
ment, Male Full Time Employees Aged 15-64
ESB Asian Other
Humanitarian 0.247 0.346
PreferentialFamily 0.325 0.378 0.349
ConcessionalFamily 0.330 0.536 0.412
IndependantSkilled 0.309 0.327 0.296
Business/ENS 0.068 0.106 0.016
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Table 4: Determinants of Overeducation, Male Full-Time Employees14
Variables ESB ASIAN OTHER
Unemployment Rate 0.011 (0.095) -0.021*** (0.012) 0.0002 (0.011)
Days since arrival 0.00005 (0.0002) 0.000002 (0.00002) -0.00004** (0.00001)
Age -0.030*** (0.017) 0.035*** (0.019) 0.013 (0.013)
Age2 0.0003 (0.0002) -0.0003 (0.0002) -0.0001 (0.0001)
Qualication Assessed -0.006 (0.036) 0.120* (0.045) 0.140* (0.034)
Not Married 0.070 (0.044) 0.081*** (0.043) 0.061** (0.029)
Visa - Humanitarian . -0.005 (0.097) 0.521* (0.057)
Visa - Preferential Family 0.25* (0.078) 0.314* (0.068) 0.403* (0.046)
Visa - Concessional Family 0.321* (0.058) 0.311* (0.060) 0.528* (0.060)
Visa - Independent Skilled 0.230* (0.064) 0.123*** (0.068) 0.365* (0.079)
Never Visited Australia -0.016 (0.040) 0.047 (0.041) 0.012 (0.029)
No Funds on Arrival 0.063 (0.084) 0.139* (0.044) -0.012 (0.033)
No Car -0.034 (0.051) 0.062*** (0.035) 0.034 (0.034)
Employed in Former Country 0.02 (0.043) 0.023 (0.043) 0.051*** (0.031)
Speak English Well 0.130* (0.039) -0.024 (0.029)
Speak English Poor 0.078 (0.058) -0.054 (0.037)
 0.761*(0.062) 0.847*(0.036) 0.937*(0.016)
Obs. 839 1109 1231
Groups 376 582 666
Wald chi2 39.58 77.76 57.66
Prob > chi2 0.0003 0 0
Prob (chibar) 0 0 0
Log-likelihood -338.512 -532.923 -539.882
14Estimates are marginal e¤ects reported at the sample means.
* 1% level of signicance, ** 5% level of signicance,*** 10% level of signicance. Standard
errors in parentheses..
Omitted categories are Married, Other States, Business/ENS Visa, Visited Australia Be-
fore, Have Car, Not Employed in Former Country, Had Funds on Arrival and Speak English
Fluently.
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Table 5: Log Weekly Wage Earnings, Male Full-Time Employees 15-6415
Variables ESB ASIAN OTHER
Unemployment Rate -0.002 (0.008) -0.007 (0.010) -0.003 (0.009)
Days since arrival 0.0001* (0.00001) 0.0002* (0.00002) 0.0002* (0.00001)
Required Schooling 0.114* (0.010) 0.094* (0.010) 0.097* (0.008)
Surplus Schooling 0.069* (0.010) 0.052* (0.011) 0.049* (0.009)
Age 0.063* (0.013) -0.018 (0.015) 0.029** (0.012)
Age2 -0.001* (0.0001) 0.0002 (0.0002) -0.0003** (0.0001)
Qualication Assessed -0.050** (0.025) 0.073** (0.030) -0.010 (0.026)
Not Married -0.031 (0.031) -0.080* (0.035) 0.044 (0.028)
Never Visited Australia -0.051*** (0.030) -0.097* (0.034) -0.110* (0.027)
No Funds on Arrival -0.136** (0.054) -0.050 (0.035) -0.094* (0.029)
No Car 0.018 (0.035) -0.041 (0.029) -0.025 (0.027)
Employed in Former Country -0.025 (0.033) 0.042 (0.035) 0.023 (0.028)
Speak English Well -0.106* (0.032) -0.059*** (0.032)
Speak English Poor -0.168* (0.042) -0.107* (0.039)
 0.662 0.619 0.555
Obs. 839 1016 1231
Groups 376 582 666
Wald chi2 367.82 395.95 522.16
Prob > chi2 0 0 0
R2 0.38 0.33 0.37
15* 1% level of signicance, ** 5% level of signicance,*** 10% level of signicance. Standard
errors in parentheses.
Omitted categories are Married, Other States, Visited Australia Before, Have Car, Not
Employed in Former Country, Had Funds on Arrival and Speak English Fluently.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A1 - Summary Statistics, Males 15-64.
Variables ESB ASIAN OTHER
Years of Schooling 14.52 13.20 13.39
Age 35.87 34.89 33.04
Not married 0.28 0.29 0.29
Visa -Humanitarian . 0.15 0.26
Visa - preferential family 0.17 0.19 0.37
Visa - concessional family 0.22 0.26 0.15
Visa - Independent 0.25 0.24 0.16
Visa - Business/ENS 0.35 0.16 0.06
Never visited Australia 0.23 0.59 0.68
No funds on arrival 0.06 0.32 0.40
No car 0.09 0.31 0.40
Employed in former country 0.76 0.63 0.60
Speak English Fluently 0.16 0.10
Speak English Well 0.47 0.44
Speak English Poorly 0.37 0.46
Employed in Wave 1 0.72 0.37 0.30
Individuals 457 978 1253
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TABLE A2 - Variable Denitions
Variables Description
Age Continuous variable for age of immigrant.
Years of Schooling Number of years of study undertaken to obtain qualications
Required Education Level of education required to do a job as indicated by ASCO codes
Surplus Education The additional years of education of jobholder over what is required to do his/her job
Visa Category Business/ENS visa is the omitted category
Humanitarian Individual entered under a humanitarian visa
Preferential Family Individual entered under a preferential family visa
Concessional Family Individual entered under a concessional family visa
Independent Skilled Individual entered under an independent skilled visa
Unemployment Rate Monthly unemployment rate for the State the immigrant was living in at time of each interview
Days since Arrival Length of time the immigrant has been residing in Australia at time of interviews
Qualication Assessed Individual has had their foreign obtained qualication assessed
Never Visited Australia Individual had previously visited prior to immigrating
No Funds on Arrival Individual arrived with funds
No Car Individual has access to a privately owned motor vehicle
Employed in Former country Individual was an employee in his/her former country in the last 12 months prior to immigration
Not Married Individual was not married
English Language Skills Speak English Fluently is the omitted category
Speak English Well Individual claims to speak English "very well" or "well"
Speak English Poorly Individual claims to speak English "not well" or "not at all"
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